I am older, maybe six, and we are outside. It is
night again, stars over the apartment houses of the Bronx, paler
because of the lights...I am looking up at the buildings, and the sky
and I am very sad. Knowing this is the last time I’ll see this
street, my grandparents are moving. It is the first time I know that
“this is the last time” for something and I can hardly bear it...I
have somehow some paper with me is how I remember it, but maybe I make
it up then and write it down later. For years I had the copy in my
first-grade Catholic-school hand: the poem I made to comfort myself
that night, to “remember forever” the stars over those tall white
apartment houses. My first poem and it worked, still works, I still
remember that sky. Poem as the gift of memory. Mnemosyne. Mother.
--Diane di Prima, Recollections
of my Life as a Woman: The New York Years
Poet
Jake Berry asked several poets questions about their work. These are my
responses.
1
Question:
Myth
and Memory—
How
does memory work in myth?
What
function does memory serve in your poetry?
To
what extent is your poetry a mythologizing?
Does
poetry have to be descriptive or narrative in order to be mythic?
Response:
I
[The term] “false memory syndrome” usually
refers to a pattern of memories of events in one’s own past that never
took place. It is not that the events are remembered inaccurately (for
most events are). It is rather that nothing remotely like those events
occurred.
--Ian Hacking, Rewriting
the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory
The
Muses are fabled to be the daughters of Memory (“Mnemosyne”)--a
fiction which suggests that each Muse was created as a specific
individual emphasis of the general activity of remembering. Clio is
specifically the muse of history--Memory in the field of history.
In
The Art of Memory, Frances A.
Yates re-tells (remembers) Cicero’s story from De
Oratore of the invention of “the art of memory”:
At a banquet given by a nobleman of Thessaly named
Scopas, the poet Simonides of Ceos chanted a lyric poem in honour of his
host but including a passage in praise of Castor and Pollux. Scopas
meanly told the poet that he would only pay him half the sum agreed upon
for the panegyric and that he must obtain the balance from the twin gods
to whom he had devoted half the poem. A little later, a message was
brought in to Simonides that two young men were waiting outside who
wished to see him. He rose from the banquet and went out but could find
no one. During his absence the roof of the banqueting hall fell in,
crushing Scopas and all the guests to death beneath the ruins; the
corpses were so mangled that the relatives who came to take them away
for burial were unable to identify them. But Simonides remembered the
places at which they had been sitting at the table and was therefore
able to indicate to the relatives which were their dead. The invisible
callers, Castor and Pollux, had handsomely paid for their share in the
panegyric by drawing Simonides away from the banquet just before the
crash. And the experience suggested to the poet the principles of the
art of memory of which he is said to have been the inventor.
Cicero
comments that Simonides
inferred that persons desiring to train this
faculty (of memory) must select places and form mental images of the
things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so
that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and
the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall
employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and
the letters written on it.
This
account of the origin of the “art of memory” is not itself a memory
but a fiction--a story, a myth, perhaps a “false memory.” Yet it is
sufficiently vivid to be unforgettable. The story connects memory to
poetry, place, transformation, the divine, and, finally, to writing:
“we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax
writing-tablet and the letters written on it.”
If
there is a center to my work, it is the notion of self-knowledge. Yet it
seems to me that the supreme moment of self-knowledge--the moment in
which we know ourselves most intensely--is also
the moment of fictionalizing,
the moment in which we tell a story. Self-knowledge is thus permeated
with fiction--with what might be thought of as a kind of “lying”; it
stands as close to falsehood as it does to truth.
Yet
this is not to say that self-knowledge doesn’t exist. It is only to
say that it is never anything other than problematical: it is constantly
(and only) at the point of its own revelation, in a state of struggle
and disclosure. Hans-Georg Gadamer remarked in Philosophical
Hermeneutics that Martin Heidegger’s work “pursued the intrinsic
and indissoluable interinvolvement of authenticity and inauthenticity,
of truth and error, and the concealment that is essential to and
accompanies every disclosure....” I wrote something similar about the
poet Delmore Schwartz: “Few poets have been so committed to art as
self-consciousness; few poets have understood so clearly that
self-consciousness is necessarily shot through with fantasy and
fiction.”
Poetry
as “a supreme fiction”--to use Wallace Stevens’s phrase--is poetry
as the instigator of the “mythic moment,” the moment in which myth
(or self-knowledge) “happens.” The Simonides story is such a mythic
moment. It functions as an originating impulse which generates a number
of assumptions about the world--a gathering space for various issues. It
asserts (falsely) that it is about the past, but it is actually far more
about the future. It does not refer to something previously existing so
much as it founds
something; it is the basis for seeing the world in a certain way. It
raises moral issues (don’t welch on people; respect the gods, who are
stronger than earthly potentates) but it also goes much further. It
speaks to our fears of being in the world (the house you’re in may be
suddenly smashed to pieces) and it simultaneously allays such fears
(propitiate the gods and you’ll survive); it raises issues of power,
ego, and of the power of words.
At
the same time, it is “just a story”: we don’t have to believe it.
Or we can interpret it in ways which seem far-fetched,
“inappropriate,” as people often do with stories. Though it presents
itself as “history”--these events
happened to these particular people who lived at such and such a
time in such and such a place--it is in fact nothing but meaning,
material for interpretation.
It’s
possible that Scopas of Thessaly and Simonides of Ceos were people who
“actually existed”--so to that extent the story is an example of
history or “memory.” The existence of Castor and Pollux, on the
other hand, is considerably more in doubt, though they “exist” in
the story on a more or less equal basis with Scopas and Simonides.
(We can also ask whether Scopas has failed to “remember” the
gods.)
Like
the Greeks, we are familiar with disasters in which “the corpses [are]
so mangled that the relatives who came to take them away for burial were
unable to identify them.” To me, that detail seems extremely
“real”--a genuine example of “memory.” Reading about that
incident, I found myself thinking of the horrifying photographs of
Auschwitz, a fact the inventors of the story could hardly have known
about. Yet my “memory” of Auschwitz adds to the emotional resonance
of the story. My knowledge of the London blitz is relevant as well.
Couldn’t we move easily from that detail to “A Refusal To Mourn the
Death, By Fire, of a Child in London,” Dylan Thomas’s poem
memorializing a child killed in a London air-raid--a poem which I once
memorized?
Deep with the first dead lies London’s daughter,
Robed in the long friends,
The grains beyond age, the dark veins of her
mother,
Secret by the unmourning water
Of the riding Thames.
After the first death, there is no other.
The
Simonides story is nothing but meaning, and meaning cuts across time and
cultures into a realm which makes use of times and cultures but which is
not limited to any of them. The realm of “meaning” is the realm of
myth, of story--the luminous intersection point of fact and fiction, of
truth and longing: “mixing / Memory and desire,” as T.S. Eliot put
it in “The Waste Land.” Rabbi Michael Lerner rightly speaks of
“the hunger for meaning”--the hunger for myth, for story.
There
are only a few books that made me want to become a writer. One of these
was Thomas Wolfe’s novel, Look
Homeward, Angel. Another was Thomas Gray’s 18th‑century
poem, “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard.” I read both works
when I was quite young. Wolfe called his book “a novel of the buried
life”; “the buried life” is also a theme—a very literal one—of
Gray’s “Elegy.” (I came upon Matthew Arnold’s poem, “The
Buried Life,” only much later, in college.) I believe I was being
taught two things by these works: the first was the notion that there
was such a thing as a “buried life”--which was news to me; the
second was that the “buried life” had a special language.
“Poetry” was for me the language of the “buried life”--and so it
remains. But by the “buried life” I do not mean the realm of the
“unconscious.” I mean rather the moment in which meaning or
self-consciousness erupts into language--the moment of myth. That such a
moment somehow involves “memory” has long been recognized. Ezra
Pound translated--and enjoyed quoting--“Canzone” by the medieval
Italian poet, Guido Cavalcanti (1255-1300). In Cavalcanti’s poem the
moment of revelation or myth is called “Love,” but its place, its
“locus” is memory--“dove sta memoria”:
Because a lady asks me, I would tell
Of an affect that comes often and is fell
And is so overweening: Love by name...
In memory’s locus (dove
sta memoria) taketh he his state....
Pound
adds in commentary, “These are no [poems] for an idle hour. It is only
when the emotions illumine the perceptive powers that we see the reality.
It is in the light born of this double current that we look upon the face
of the mystery unveiled.” “Memoria” here is not the assertion of
“what actually happened” but the intersection point of actuality and
fantasy— “truth” and “falsehood.”
(Continued)
Jack Foley